4th Amendment

Vengeancia (updated June 26, 2014) “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Read more.

What is a legal “person?” Check out these ideas and videos from activist Kurt Kallenbach. Cops need a warrant to search your cell phone. Here’s the decision; here’s an explanation.

Bill of Rights Institute Logo

Bill of Rights Institute Logo

“The Founders believed that freedom from government intrusion into one’s home was a natural right and fundamental to liberty. During the colonial era, lawyer James Otis argued in court against British use of writs of assistance, which were general search warrants allowing British officials to search wherever they wanted without having to say why.

His arguments were observed by John Adams, who noted that Otis’s argument against this form of British tyranny marked the beginning of the American Revolution. George Mason wrote in the Virginia Declaration of Rights that general search warrants were ‘grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted.’

The Court has held that some searches are reasonable even without a warrant. Some exceptions to the warrant requirements include searches of individuals who have consented to a search and people who have been lawfully arrested.” Read more.

“STATE OF WASHINGTON like every other STATE in existence today is in fact and law a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION operating under TERRITORIAL LAW because ALL States in existence today are in fact and law Territories and Possession of the United States.” Read this information.

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Edward Stimson: Jurisdiction Over Corporations

Edward Stimson: Jurisdiction Over Corporations

ABANDONED PROPERTY The right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is based upon an expectation of privacy in a person’s property. If the person abandons his or her property, he or she no longer has an expectation of privacy in the property. The police may conduct a search of the abandoned property and may seize the abandoned property without a warrant.

No Nazi TSA Checkpoints from Luis Ewing, PDF.

Expectation of Privacy

The main issue regarding abandoned property is whether a person has voluntarily relinquished his or her interest in the property with no further an expectation of privacy in the property. Abandonment depends upon the person’s intent, that is, whether the person intended to relinquish control of the property. The person’s words and actions determine intent. If the person makes a statement that the property does not belong to him or her, the property is abandoned. If the person leaves the property in a public place, throws the property away, or places the property in a location where it can no longer be retrieved by that the person, the property is abandoned. However, the abandonment must be voluntary and cannot be the result of an act of carelessness or negligence.

When property is abandoned as a result of a person being stopped by the police, whether the property is voluntarily abandoned depends upon whether the conduct of the police is legal or illegal. If the police legally stop the person, the person’s abandonment of the property is voluntary. If the police engage in misconduct and illegally stop the person, the person’s abandonment of the property is involuntary and seizure by the policy may be improper. However, mere pursuit by the police does not constitute a seizure of the person until the person is detained by the police. Abandonment of the property during the pursuit may or may not be voluntary depending upon whether the pursuit was reasonable.

An issue that often arises with abandoned property is whether the fact that the person could have retrieved the property constitutes abandonment of the property. An example of this issue is leaving garbage for collection on a street. It has been argued that until the garbage is collected, the person could have retrieved the garbage and therefore did not abandon the property. The courts have resolved this issue by holding that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage when he or she leaves it for collection on the street and that the property is therefore abandoned.

An automobile left on the side of a road may or may not be abandoned. Factors for determining whether the automobile is abandoned are whether the automobile is left in a dangerous location, whether the automobile is capable of being driven, and whether the keys are in the automobile.

In summary, whether property is abandoned and may be searched by the police without a warrant depends upon the intent of the person in abandoning the property. Read more.

“The Constitution of most of our states (and of the United States) assert that all power is inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by themselves; that it is their right and duty to be at all times armed and that they are entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and freedom of press.”[Emphasis added] Thomas Jefferson

“If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense…” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 28; here.

Are Americans being transported “beyond the seas” virtually? Listen to singer Bobby Darin explain how this works….here.

Legal Requirements of an Arrest

Fourth Amendment DOT com

A sovereignty cannot act upon or deal with an act. It cannot impound or destroy an act. It can only affect an act indirectly through its power over the actor. It would seem then that whether or not a sovereignty’s law applied to a particular act would depend upon the location of the actor at the time he performed the act and not upon the location of the act.” Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 1933, by Edward S. Stimson, PDF.

From the Free Dictionary: The American Revolution was fought, in part, to create a system of government in which the Rule of Law would reign supreme. The rule of law is often identified with the old saying that the United States is a nation of laws and not of men. Under the rule of law, the actions of government officials are prescribed by the principles and laws that make up the U.S. legal system and do not reflect the Arbitrary whims and caprices of the government officials themselves.

A distinction is sometimes drawn between power and authority. Law enforcement officers are entrusted with the powers to conduct investigations, to make arrests, and occasionally to use lethal force in the line of duty. But these powers must be exercised within the parameters authorized by the law. Power exercised outside of these legal parameters transforms law enforcers into lawbreakers, as happened when Los Angeles police officer Laurence Powell was convicted for using excessive force against rodney king, who had been stopped for speeding. Powell repeatedly struck King with his night-stick even though King was in a submissive position, lying prone on the ground.

The Fourth Amendment was intended to create a constitutional buffer between U.S. citizens and the intimidating power of law enforcement. It has three components. First, it establishes a privacy interest by recognizing the right of U.S. citizens to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Second, it protects this privacy interest by prohibiting searches and seizures that are “unreasonable” or are not authorized by a warrant based upon probable cause. Third, it states that no warrant may be issued to a law enforcement officer unless that warrant describes with particularity “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment in response to their colonial experience with British officials, whose discretion in collecting revenues for the Crown often went unchecked. Upon a mere suspicion held by British tax collectors or their informants, colonial magistrates were compelled to issue general warrants, which permitted blanket door-to-door searches of entire neighborhoods without limitation as to person or place. The law did not require magistrates to question British officials regarding the source of their suspicion or to make other credibility determinations.

The writ of assistance was a particularly loathsome form of general warrant. The name of this writ derived from the power of British authorities to enlist local peace officers and colonial residents who might “assist” in executing a particular search. A writ of assistance lasted for the life of the king or queen under whom it was issued, and it applied to every officer and subject in the British Empire. In essence, such a writ was a license for customs officers tracking smugglers and illegally imported goods.

Colonial opposition to general warrants was pervasive and kinetic. In Paxton’s Case (also known as the Writs of Assistance Case), 1 Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761), James Otis, appearing on behalf of colonists who opposed the issuance of another writ of assistance, denounced general warrants as instruments of “slavery,” “villainy,” and “arbitrary power.” These writs, Otis continued, were “the most destructive of English liberty” because they placed the freedom of every person “in the hands of a petty officer” (as quoted in O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 [10th Cir. 1989]). In order to be valid, Otis railed, a warrant must be “directed to specific officers, and to search certain houses” for particular goods, and may only be granted “upon oath made” by a government official “that he suspects such goods to be concealed in those very places he desires to search” (as quoted in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 [1987]).

Although Otis lost the case, his arguments fueled angry colonial crowds that subsequently interfered with British customs and revenue agents who attempted to seize miscellaneous goods pursuant to general warrants. Some provincial courts began declining to issue writs of assistance, and other courts issued writs with greater specificity. Colonial newspapers complained that British officers were ransacking the colonists’ houses, violating the sanctity of their bedrooms, and plundering their privacy under the auspices of general warrants. On the night before the Declaration of Independence was published, John Adams cited the “argument concerning the Writs of Assistance … as the commencement of the controversy between Great Britain and America.”

The American Revolution answered the questions surrounding writs of assistance, but the Fourth Amendment raised other questions in the newly founded republic. If a police officer’s suspicion is no longer sufficient to obtain a Search Warrant, as it was in colonial America, where should the line be drawn separating suspicion from probable cause? Although general warrants are now clearly prohibited, how detailed must warrants be to pass constitutional muster? The Fourth Amendment expressly forbids “unreasonable” searches and seizures, but what criteria should be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a search? The Fourth Amendment also leaves open the question of who should review warrant applications—the judiciary or some other branch of government. The answers to these questions were explored and developed in criminal litigation over the next two centuries.

Fourth Amendment questions arise during criminal litigation in the context of a suppression hearing. This hearing is prompted by a defendant who asks the court to review the method by which the police obtained evidence against him or her, and to determine whether that evidence survives constitutional scrutiny. If the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it usually will be excluded from trial, which means the prosecution will be unable to present it to the jury. The legal doctrine under which illegally obtained evidence is suppressed is known as the Exclusionary Rule, and its purpose is to deter police misconduct and to protect defendants from it.

The exclusionary rule requires the suppression not only of evidence that was the direct product of illegal police work but also of any evidence that is derived from a tainted source. The suppression of tainted derivative evidence, also known as Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, typically occurs when the police obtain a confession after an illegal arrest or pursuant to an unconstitutional search. Although the manner in which the confession itself was obtained may have been perfectly constitutional, the confession is still suppressed because the law does not permit the government, which the prosecution represents at a criminal trial, to benefit from its own misconduct.

Before a court may exclude any evidence, it first must determine whether the Fourth Amendment even applies to the case under consideration. Two requirements must be met before a particular search or seizure will give rise to Fourth Amendment protection. First, the search or seizure must have been conducted by a government agent or pursuant to government direction. Thus, the actions of state and federal law enforcement officers or private persons working with law enforcement officers will be subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Bugging, wire tapping, and other related eavesdropping activities performed by purely private citizens, such as private investigators, will not receive Fourth Amendment protection.

Second, a defendant must be able to demonstrate that he or she had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the place that was searched or the thing that was seized (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 576 [1967]). In Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection… . Butwhat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”

Applying this principle, the Court has ruled that U.S. citizens maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “curtilage” immediately surrounding their home, but not in the “open fields” and “wooded areas” extending beyond this area (Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898 [1924]). A person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile that he or she is driving, but not in items that are in “plain view” from outside the vehicle (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 564 [1971]). Nor do people have reasonable expectations of privacy in personal characteristics (United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67[1973]). Thus, the police may require individuals to give handwriting and voice exemplars as well as fingerprint samples, without complying with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant or reasonableness requirements.

In Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed.2d 373 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a police officer who had looked in an apartment window through a gap in a closed window blind had violated the privacy of the drug dealers in the apartment because they had an expectation of privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the police officer had not violated the Fourth Amendment because the occupants of the apartment had not had an expectation of privacy. This was due to the fact the drug dealers had merely used the apartment to consummate business transactions and that they had no personal relationship with the occupant of the apartment.

However, the high court looked at the issue differently when the drug courier’s contraband was discovered on a bus by an officer who thought that a bag felt peculiar. In Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed.2d 365(2000), it ruled that police cannot squeeze the luggage of bus passengers in order to try to find illegal drugs. The ruling forces law enforcement to modify the way they inspect luggage and packages that are carried by, or in the custody of an individual.

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that there are limits to high-tech government snooping when the government has the ability to use sophisticated technology to monitor criminal suspects. In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed.2d 94 (2001), the Court ruled that police could not use evidence obtained through the use of thermal imaging without first obtaining a search warrant. It declared that a warrantless search would be regarded as “presumptively unreasonable” and that the evidence that the search produced will be inadmissible at trial. The police had received a tip that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his home. Because marijuana cultivation requires the use of high-intensity lamps, police used a thermal imager to scan Kyllo’s residence. The imager detects infrared radiation, which is invisible to the naked eye. The machine converts the radiation into images based on relative warmth. The police conducted the scan across the street from Kyllo’s home, accomplishing the task in just a few minutes. The scan disclosed that one part of his house was substantially hotter than any other unit in his triplex. Based on the scan, utility bills, and tips from informants, police secured a search warrant and found that Kyllo had indeed been growing marijuana.

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the degree of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment had been affected by technological developments. The question became “what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.” In its view, individuals had a “minimum expectation of privacy”that the interiors of their homes were not subject to warrantless police searches.”Thus, the use of “sense-enhancing technology” that could obtain information that would otherwise only be obtainable by a physical search constituted a “search.” Accordingly, any information obtained by the thermal imager was the product of a search. The Court’s analysis led to the legal conclusion that such a search was unreasonable and that it could be justified only if it were made pursuant to a warrant.

Once a court has determined that the Fourth Amendment is an issue in a particular case, it next must decide whether law enforcement complied with the amendment’s requirements. When making this decision, a court begins with the premise that the Constitution expresses a preference for searches made pursuant to a warrant (Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 [1978]). Searches performed without a warrant are presumptively invalid, and evidence seized during a warrantless search is suppressed unless the search was reasonable under the circumstances.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that warrantless searches may be deemed reasonable in certain situations. First, no warrant is required for searches incident to a lawful arrest (United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 [1976]). If a police officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred, the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to arrest the suspect and to conduct a search of the suspect’s person and clothing and of all areas within the suspect’s immediate reach. Second, a police officer who possesses an “articulable” and “reasonable” suspicion that an automobile has violated a state or local traffic law may stop the driver and conduct a search of the vehicle’s interior, including the glove compartment (Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 [1979]). The trunk of a vehicle cannot be searched unless an officer has probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or the instrumentalities of criminal activity.

Third, an officer who reasonably believes “that criminal activity may be afoot” in a public place may stop an individual who is suspected of wrongdoing and “conduct a carefully limited search of [the suspect's] outer clothing” for weapons that may be used against the officer (terry v. ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 21 L. Ed. 889 [1968]). Fourth, officers who are in “hot pursuit” of “fleeing felons” or are gathering “evanescent” evidence (evidence that could readily disappear—e.g. blood samples from drunken drivers) are also permitted to act without first obtaining a search warrant.

These four exceptions to the warrant requirement are based on the need to facilitate law enforcement during unforeseen or emergency circumstances in which criminal activity is strongly suspected but police officers lack sufficient time to complete an application for a search warrant and to testify before a magistrate. These exceptions also reflect a need to protect police officers from hidden weapons and to preserve evidence that easily could be destroyed or compromised.

When law enforcement does obtain a warrant before conducting a search, the warrant must comply with the Fourth Amendment before evidence from the search will be admissible in court. A warrant may be defective if it is not supported by probable cause that is established by a detailed, sworn statement made by a law enforcement officer appearing before a magistrate.

No definition of probable cause has ever satisfied both prosecutors and defense attorneys. But the U.S. Supreme Court has said that probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within [the police officer's] knowledge” are of a “reasonably trustworthy” basis to “warrant a man of reasonable caution” to believe that an offense has been or is about to be committed (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 [1925]). Probable cause can be established by out-of-court statements of reliable police informants even though the credibility of those statements cannot be tested by a magistrate (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 [1983]). However, probable cause will not be found where the only evidence of criminal activity is an officer’s “good information” or “belief” (Aguilar v. Texas, 378U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 [1964]).

The Fourth Amendment requires not only that search warrants be supported by probable cause but also that they “particularly” describe the person or place to be searched. A warrant must provide enough detail so that an “officer with the search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place [or person] intended” (Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S. Ct. 414, 69 L. Ed. 757 [1925]). For most residences, a street address usually satisfies the particularity requirement. However, if a warrant designates an apartment complex, hotel, or other multiple-unit building, the warrant must describe the specific sub-unit that will be searched. When a warrant designates that a person will be searched, it must include a description that provides enough detail so that the suspect’s identity can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.

Probable cause must be established by testimony made under oath by a law enforcement officer appearing before a magistrate. The testimony can be oral or written, and it cannot contain any “knowingly” or “intentionally” false statements, or statements made in “reckless disregard for the truth” (Franks v. Delaware, 438U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 [1978]). Inaccuracies due to Negligence or innocent omission do not jeopardize a warrant’s validity.

The magistrate before whom an officer applies for a warrant must be “neutral and detached” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971]). This means that the magistrate must be impartial and not a member of the “competitive enterprise” of law enforcement (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 [1991]). Thus, police officers, prosecutors, and attorneys general are disqualified from the role of magistrate. However, judges, lawyers, and court clerks all potentially qualify as “neutral and detached,” and therefore may become magistrates. The requirements that states set for becoming a magistrate vary widely, from having an attorney’s license to having a high-school diploma to simply being literate.

If a search is performed pursuant to a defective warrant, any evidence obtained as a result of the search is usually suppressed. An exception to this rule arises when an officer has obtained evidence pursuant to a defective warrant that the officer relied on in “good faith” (United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 [1984]). For this exception to apply, the warrant must have been issued by a magistrate and then later ruled defective for a valid reason, and the defect must not have been the result of willful police deception. If these two requirements are satisfied, law enforcement was entitled to rely on the warrant in conducting the search, and any evidence obtained during the search is admissible against the defendant.

This exception was created to ensure that police officers would not be punished for blunders made by magistrates when issuing search warrants. Again, the primary reason courts suppress illegally obtained evidence is to deter future police misconduct. No deterrent value is served by excluding evidence obtained by an honest police officer who acted pursuant to an ostensibly valid warrant that was later ruled defective owing to an error by the magistrate.

The U.S. Supreme Court also has been asked to determine whether the way in which a search with a warrant is conducted can violate the Fourth Amendment. One troublesome area has been the question of whether police must knock on a suspect’s door and announce that they have a warrant, in order to enter the premises lawfully. The general rule is that police may make a “no-knock” entry if there are reasonable grounds for such a course of action. In Richardsv. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 615 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that announced a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations. The high court unanimously ruled that such an exception violated the Fourth Amendment and that it undermined the ability of a reviewing court to determine whether a particular no-knock entry had been reasonable. In making this ruling, the Court rejected the idea that the violent world of narcotics traffickers justified a departure from Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence.

One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the standards to which police will be held when they execute “no-knock” searches, in U.S.v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 118 S. Ct. 992, 140 L. Ed.2d 191 (1998). It held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a higher standard when a “no-knock” entry results in the destruction of property. In Ramirez,a federal district court suppressed two weapons that had been seized as evidence because the police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment and 18U.S.C.A. § 3109, which permits federal law enforcement officers to damage property in certain instances. The Court acknowledged that excessive or unnecessary destruction of property during a search could be a violation of the Fourth Amendment “even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression.” However, in that case, the officers’ actions had been reasonable, based on an informant’s information, as the officers had not wanted the suspect to seek out the weapons.

Police often justify a search and seizure by stating that the suspect consented. Again, the U.S. Supreme Court has had to determine the boundaries of consent. In U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed.2d 242 (2002), the Court reviewed an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that invalidated the pat-down search of two defendants who had been on a cross-country bus trip, even though both defendants had consented to the search. The appeals court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the search had not been sufficiently free of coercion to serve as a constitutional basis for the search. The high court reversed the decision, holding that police officers on public transportation do not need to inform each passenger that they have the right to refuse a search, pat-down, or questioning in order for the investigation to remain constitutional. It deemed the distinction between the confines of a bus and the open spaces of the street to be immaterial to the reasons why citizens choose to cooperate or not. Presumably, citizens “know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them.”

Individuals who are on Probation typically sign an agreement that allows police to enter their homes in order to ensure that they are complying with the terms of probation. Questions have arisen over when police may search a probationer for another crime if the person has signed a probation agreement that permits such searches. Police and government officials have argued that they may conduct a search without a warrant if they believe that the suspect has committed a new crime. Criminal defendants have argued that probation agreements that require them to submit to searches at anytime only apply to searches that have a probationary purpose rather than an investigatory purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed.2d 497 (2002), declined to issue a bright-line rule on this dispute but concluded that when police have reasonable suspicion and the probation agreement authorizes searches, the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court applied its traditional analysis for judging whether a warrantless search was reasonable. This “totality of the circumstances” approach looks at the intrusion of individual privacy and contrasts it with “legitimate governmental interests.” Read more

“The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 establishes the limitations as to whether a foreign sovereign nation (or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities) may be sued in U.S. courts—federal or state. It also establishes specific procedures for service of process and attachment of property for proceedings against a Foreign State. The FSIA provides the exclusive basis and means to bring a lawsuit against a foreign sovereign in the United States.” Read more.

“The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 is a United States law, codified at Title 28, §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611 of the United States Code, that establishes the limitations as to whether a foreign sovereign nation (or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities) may be sued in U.S. courts—federal or state. It also establishes specific procedures for service of process and attachment of property for proceedings against a Foreign State. The FSIA provides the exclusive basis and means to bring a lawsuit against a foreign sovereign in the United States. It was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on October 21, 1976.” Read more.

Also check out this list of instructions at Family Guardian INSTRUCTIONS: 3.13.  Correct government records documenting your citizenship Status.

ARE YOU SURE YOU ARE A “DRIVER?”

SOURCE

DRIVER. One employed…
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856

DRIVER– one employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle…”
BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, (1914) p. 940.

Driver – One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. See Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344, 36 L.R.A. 615; Isaacs v. Railroad Co., 7 Am. Rep. 418, 47 N.Y. 122.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed

DRIVER. One employed…
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed, 1951

“The activity licensed by state DMVs and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV—the operation of motor vehicles—is itself integrally related to interstate commerce.”

Seth Waxman, Solicitor General U.S. Department of Justice BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
Reno v. Condon, No. 98-1464, decided January 12, 2000 Supreme Court of the United States here.

Title18, UNITED STATES CODE  Sec. 31
PART I – CRIMES
CHAPTER 2 – AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Sec. 31. Definitions

When used in this chapter the term -

”Motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo;

Motor vehicle – Laws of Florida c. 14764 (1931)

The term “motor vehicle” shall include all vehicles or machines propelled by any power other than muscular used upon the public highways (but not over fixed rails) for the transportation of persons or property for compensation either as common carriers, private contract carriers or for hire carriers.

Traffic – Webster’s Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International Illustrated Edition (1960)

1. Business or trade, commerce. 2. Transportation. 3. The movement of vehicles on street or highway, as, the traffic is very heavy today.

Traffic – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856)

Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money and the like.

Traffic – Black’s Law Dictionary 3rd

Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673, 11 N.E. 321; People v. Horan, 293 Ill. 314, 127 N.E. 673, 674; People v. Dunford, 207 N.Y. 17, 100 N.E. 433, 434; Fine v. Morgan, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533, 538; Bruno v. U. S. (C.C.A.) 289 F. 649, 655.
Traffic includes the ordinary uses of the streets and highways by travelers. Stewart v. Hugh Nawn Contracting Co., 223 Mass. 525, 112 N.E. 218, 219; Withey v. Fowler Co., 164 Iowa, 377, 145 N.W. 923, 927.

Traffic – Black’s Law Dictionary 4th

Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673, 11 N.E. 321; Fine v. Morgan, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533, 538; Bruno v. U. S. C.C.A.Mass., 289 F. 649, 655; Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Schwer, 36 Ohio App. 512, 173 N.E. 633. The subjects of transportation on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of persons, animals, vehicles, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along a street, canal, etc. United States v. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. Of California, D.C.Cal., 37 F. Supp. 505, 512.

Traffic -Black’s Law Dictionary 6th

Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing or exchange of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods and money. The subjects of transportation on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of persons, animals, vegetables, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along a street, highway, etc.

Transportation – Webster’s Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International Illustrated Edition (1960)

1. The act or business of moving passengers and goods. 2. The means of conveyance used. 3. Banishment, esp. of convicts to a penal colony.

Transportation – Black’s Law Dictionary 3rd

The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. See Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 133, 22 L.Ed. 827; Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 Sup.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 5 Sup.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158.

Under Interstate Commerce Act, (49 USCA sec. 1 et seq.), “transportation” includes the entire body of services rendered by a carrier in connection with the receipt, handling, and delivery of property transported, and includes the furnishing of cars. Pletcher v. Chicago, R. L. & P. Ry. Co., 103 Kan. 834, 177 P. 1, 2.
In a general sense transportation means merely conveyance from one place to another. People v. Martin, 235 Mich. 206, 209 N.W. 87.

Transportation – Black’s Law Dictionary 4th

The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 133, 22 L.Ed. 827; Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brimson, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed. 1047; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 5 S.Ct. 826, 114 U.S. 196, 29 L.Ed. 158.

Transportation – Black’s 6th

The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.

Transportation49 U.S.C. ¤ 5102(12)

“transports” or “transportation” means the movement of property and loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the movement.

Transportation – Words and Phrases

See State v. Western Trans Co. (1950, Iowa) 43 N.W.2d 739 [The judge, after giving his conclusion, goes on to give examples of "transportation" - all involving the movement of persons or goods for hire.]

“Prior to November 2, 1926, the Statutes of 1925 imposed a license tax … on those operating motor vehicles over the public highways for hire, … On November 2, 1926, the People adopted an amendment to article XIII, section 15, of the Constitution, changing the tax rate … on carriage of passengers and … on transportation of property, and relieving the carrier of municipal licenses and taxes.  … The amendment contained the provision that ‘Such taxes shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses’ upon the property of such companies.”
People v. Borderland Express (1933) 218 Cal. 680, 681.

“”It is obvious that those who operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire enjoy a different and more extensive use of the public highways. * * * Such extraordinary use constitutes a natural distinction and a full justification for their separate classification and for relieving from the burden of the license tax those who merely employ the public highways for the transportation of their own property or employees.”
Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss, 129 Cal. 21, 248 P. 235, 238.” (State v. Karel, 180 So. 3 at 8.)

“… [T]he exemptions provided for in section 1 of the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 833) in favor of those who solely transport their own property or employees, or both, and of those who transport no persons or property for hire or compensation, by motor vehicle, have been determined in the Bacon Service Corporation case to be lawful exemptions.
In re Schmolke (1926) 199 Cal. 42, 46.

Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links – Cases courtesy of Fourth Amendment.

Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960)
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)
Agnello v. United States
, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1925)
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964)
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994)
Alabama v. White
, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)
Alderman v. United States
, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct. 961, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969)
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976)
Arizona v. Evans
, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1995)
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009)
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013)
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971)
Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002)
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000)
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed.2d 132 (2007)
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed.2d 650 (2006)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)
Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975)
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1973)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968)
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973)
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 416 U.S. 663, 94 S. Ct. 2080, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1974)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985)
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986)
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (2011)
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1925)
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970)
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1997)
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961)
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 232 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969)
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 383 (2000)
City of Los Angeles v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 167 L. Ed. 2d 974 (2007)
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010)
Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970)
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987)
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 93 S. Ct. 611, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1973)
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991)
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973)
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979)
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1969)
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)
Donovan v. Dewey, 398 U.S. 427, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981)
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986)
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979)
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S. Ct. 1472, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1968)
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed.2d 1669 (1960)
Entick v. Carrington
, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001)
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991)
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013)
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013)
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000)
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991)
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990)
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999)
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006)
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975)
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1977)
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958)
Go-Bart Importing v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1931)
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987)
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004)
Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009)
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1924)
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004)
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1971)
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990)
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1983)
Illinois v. Caballes, 543U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005)
Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987)
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983)
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004)
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000)
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984)
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984)
James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 110 S. Ct. 648, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990)
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980)
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1948)
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)
Kaupp v. Texas
, 538 U.S. 626, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003)
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998)
Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 S. Ct. 828, 1 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1957)
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001)
Leach v. Money [Three King's Messengers], 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1765)
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S. Ct. 424, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1966)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1986)
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154 (1968)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1127 (1961)
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 94 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1987)
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1985)
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003)
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984)
Massacusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 80 L. Ed.2d 721 (1984)
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1948)
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012)
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984)
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979)
Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009)
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983)
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981)
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974)
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978)
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990)
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958)
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976)
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998)
Minnesota v. Dickerson
, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed.2d 334 (1993)
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990)
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)
Missouri v. McNeeley, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005)
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988)
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1939)
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989)
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985)
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987)
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986)
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1986)
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984)
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1987)
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984)
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1928)
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965)
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)
Paxton’s Case (Boston Super.Ct. 1761)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009)
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984)
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977)
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998)
Raddatz v. United States, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978)
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980)
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1980)
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997)
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1981)
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1952)
Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987, 181 L.Ed.2d 966 (2012)
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009)
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006)
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2006)
Sacramento County v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1988)
Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007)
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1978)
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967)
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984)
Seymane’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B. 1603)
Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S. Ct. 138, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932)
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961)
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968)
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989)
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979)
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1993)
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976)
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969)
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965)
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976)
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2004)
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 99 S. Ct. 2425, 61 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979)
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002)
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed.2d 343 (2003)
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 95 S.Ct. 915, 43 L.Ed.2d 88 (1975)
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972)
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975)
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S. Ct. 1465, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1979)
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974)
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980)
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1948)
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